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Abstract
To investigate the exploitation and contamination by self-propagating Internet worms, a provenanceaware tracing mechanism is highly desirable.
desirable. Provenance unawareness causes difficulties in fast and accurate identification of a worm's break-in point (namely, a remotely-accessible vulnerable service running in
host); and incurs significant log data inspection overhead. This paper presents the design, imthe infected host),
coloritzg, an efficient provenance-aware approach to worm breakplementation:
plementation, and evaluation of process
process coloring,
specificallyl process coloring assigns a "color",
"color", a unique system-wide
in and contamination tracing. More specifically,
identifier: to each remotely-accessible server or process. The color will then be either inherited by spawned
identifier,
(e.g.?read or write operations).
child processes or diffused indirectly through process actions (e.g.,
Process coloring brings two major advantages: (1) It enables fast color-based identification of the
break-in point exploited by a worm even before detailed log analysis;
paI1itions log data
analysis; (2) It naturally partitions
according to their associated colors, effectively reducing the volume of log data that need to be examined
and correspondingly, log processing overhead for worm investigation. A tamper-resistant log collection
method is developed based on the virtual machine introspection technique. Our experiments with a number
of real-world worms demonstrate the advantages
advantages of processing coloring. For example, to reveal detailed
SARS
% of the entire log data need to be processed. Beyond the virtual
12.1%
SARS worm contamination,
contamination. only 12.1
machine platform of our prototype, process coloring and logging mechanisms only incur a very small
additional performance penalty.
Keywords Intrusion Detection, Worm Infection and Investigation, Process Coloring

1 Introduction
Introduction
Internet worms have become more stealthy and sophisticated in their infection, exploitation, and con-

tamination. The recent absence of large-scale worm outbreaks does not indicate that Internet worms are
tamination.

[8, 9]
91 suggesting that worms may deliberately
eliminated. Quite on the contrary, there have been reports [8,
t o lurk in infected machines and surreptitiously inflict
avoid fast massive propagation. Instead, they attempt to
[ I , 34,
34, 45].
451. .In
malign contaminations such as rootkit and backdoor installation [I,
In the combat against worms,
t o the understanding of a worm's
worm's exploitation details and to the recovery of an
the following tasks are critical to
infected host from worm contaminations: (1) identifying the break-in point, namely the vulnerable, remotely

(2) determining all contaminations and damages
accessible service via which the worm infects the victim and (2)
inflicted by the worm during its residence in the victim. To perform these tasks, various intrusion analysis

tools can be used [12,
[12, 31, 35, 36].
361. For example,
example, BackTracker [36]
[36] is an advanced forensic tool that traces
back an intrusion starting from a "detection
"detection point" and identifies files
files and processes that could have affected
that detection point. The tool takes the entire log file
file of the host as input for the back-tracking.
Log-based intrusion analysis tools face the following challenges: (1)
(1) Many tools [13,
[13, 36, 56]
561 rely on
an externally-determined
extenzally-determi~zeddetection point, from which a forensic investigation will be initiated towards the
break-in point of the intrusion. However, due to a worm's possibly long "infection-to-detection"
"infection-to-detection" duration,
it may be days or even weeks later when such a detection point is identified.
identified. It is therefore desirable that
the log data carry more information and provide "leads"
(2) Current
"leads" to initiate more timely investigations. (2)
operating systems lack a provenance-aware mechanism to pre-classify
pre-classify the log data before log analysis. On
the other hand, log data generated by the system may be of large volume. As reported in [36],
[36], log data as
large as 1.2GB can be generated within one day and need to be examined for an intrusion back-track. The
uncategorized bulk log data are likely to result in long duration and high overhead in worm investigation.
Although human investigators can provide heuristics (such as the "filtering
"filtering rules" in [36]) to reduce the log
space to be examined, such heuristics may lead to inaccuracy or incompleteness in worm investigation results.
(3)
(3) Many log-based tools do not address tamper-resistant log collection, which is essential in dealing with
advanced worms.
worms. As shown in Section 2.3, a commonly adopted mechanism, i.e., syscall-wrapping, for
collecting system call traces can be easily circumvented during an attack.
attack.
In this paper, we present the design,
design, implementation, and evaluatio,!
evaluationp of process coloring, an efficient
provenance-aware approach to worm break-in and contamination investigation. More specifically, process
coloring associates a "color",
"color", a unique system-wide identifier, to each remotely-accessible server or process a potential worm break-in point. The color will be either inherited directly by any spawned child process, or

diffused indirectly through the processes'
processes' actions (e.g., read or write operations). As a result, any process or
object (e.g.,
(e.g., a file
file or directory) affected by a colored process will be tainted with the same color, as recorded
in the corresponding log entry. Process coloring naturally leads to the following two key advantages:

Color-based
Color-based identification of a worm's break-in
break-in point All worm-infecte-d
worm-infected processes and contaminated objects will be tainted with the same color as the original vulnerable service, which is exploited by the worm as
the break-in point. By simply examining the color of any worm-related log entry or any worm-affected object,
the break-in point of the corresponding worm can be immediately identified before detailed log analysis.
analysis.

Natural partition of log data The colors of log entries provide a natural way to partition the log.
log. To reveal
the contaminations caused by a worm, it
i t is no longer necessary to examine the entire log file.
file. Instead, only log
entries with the same color as the worm's entry point will need to be inspected.
inspected. Such partition can substantially
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reduce the volume of relevant log data, and thereby improve the efficiency of worm investigation.
investisation.
The practicality and effectiveness of process coloring are demonstrated using a number of real-world selfpropagating worms and their variants. For each of these worms,
worms, we are able to fast identify the vulnerable
networked service exploited by the wonn.
worm. Moreover, reduction of inspected Jog
log data is achieved
achieved in each
worm experiment.
wonn [11]
experiment. For example, for a detailed SARS worm
[ I I] break-in and contamination investigation,
investigation,
only 12.1
% of the entire Jog
12.1%
log data need to be inspected. Our prototype also addresses the important requirement
of tamper-resistant log data recording. Virtual machine techniques such as VMware [10],
[ I 01, Denal
Denalii [54],
[54], Xen
[24],
[24], and User-Mode Linux (UML) [22]
[22] provide a better instrumentation facility than the system call hooking
mechanism to safely obtain and collect internal
internal states,
states, including the worm exploitation and contamination
information. We adopt a technique similar to Livewire [28]
[28] and develop an extension to the UML virtual
machine monitor (VMM) for tamper-resistant logging.
We in this paper focus
focus on the application of process coloring to the investigation
investigation of Internet worms.
worms.
However,
However, we also note that process coloring is a generic,
generic, extensible mechanism and some of its potentials
will be presented in Section 5.
I. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
5.1.
follows: Section 2 provides an overview
overview
of the process coloring scheme,
scheme, whose implementation is presented in Section 3. Experimental evaluation
results are presented in Section 4. Other applications and possible attacks are addressed in Section 5.
5. Section
66 discusses
discusses related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes this paper.
paper.

2 Process Coloring Approach
2.1
2.1

Initial Coloring
Figure 1I shows a process coloring view of a networked host system running multiple servers.
servers. A unique

system-wide
system-wide identifier called color is assigned to each server process. The color assignment takes place after
the server processes have started but before serving client requests. A worm breaking into the system will need
to exploit a certain vulnerability of a (colored) server process. Because any action performed by the exploited
process will lead to a corresponding color diffusion
diffusiol? in the host (Section 2.2), the break-in and contaminations
by the worm will be evidenced by the color of the affected processes and system resources and by the color
of the corresponding log entries.
entries.
Each remotely-accessible service is performed by one or more active processes in the host. For example,
example,
the Samba service will start with two different processes smbd
smbd and nmbd;
nmbd; and both portmap and rpc.statd
processes belong to the NFS/RPC
NFSIRPC service. Such processes can be assigned the same color.
color. However,
However, if we
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Figure 1:
1 : Process coloring view of a system running multiple servers
need
need to
to further
further differentiate each individual
individual process (e.g.,
(e.g., "which Apache process is exploited by a Slapper
worm?"), different
of such
different colors
colors can be assigned
assigned to processes belonging to the same service. One benefit of
assignment is
is that it provides a finer
finer granularity in log data partition. Alternatively, it is possible to define a
color with two
two fields:
fields: a major field
field indicating the service and a minor field differentiating between individual
working
working processes of the same
same service.
service. For simplicity, we consider each color as having only one single field
in
in this
this paper.
paper.
We
identifies a process, it is not suitable for coloring
We note
note that although the process identifier
identifier (PID)
(PID) uniquely identifies
purpose.
purpose. Firstly,
Firstly, PIDs are
are generated without any awareness of break-in points. Consider a zombie process, it
PID. Secondly, it is possible that a process
is
is not possible to tell
tell its
its break-in point simply by its PID or parent's PID.
of another active process. In
dynamically injects
injects a customized code (e.g.,
(e.g., a whole library) into the code space of
this
this case,
case, the
the PID is
is not capable of reflecting the impact of the former process on the latter. Such an attack has
rootkit[ 1]) and there exist open-source libraries (e.g.,
become
become popular on Windows
Windows platform (e.g.,
(e.g., the hxdef rootkit[l])
Injectso
lnjectso [2])
[2]) which provide
provide similar functionality for Linux and Solaris platforms. In our design, a new field is

defined in the
the operating system kernel to record the current colors of active processes.
defined

2.2 Color
Color Diffusion Model
2.2
the service processes are initially colored,
colored, the colors will be diffused to other processes according
After the
to the
the operations performed by the processes. To reveal worm contaminations, we are especially interested in
to
process color diffusion
diffusion via system-wide shared
shared resources, such as files,
process
files, directories, and sockets. For a worm
to inflict contamination (e.g.,
(e.g., backdoor installation), it needs to go through a number of
of system calls. Hence
to
the process colors
colors are
are diffused
diffused to the affected system resources via the operations performed by the system
the
calls. Table
Table 11 shows
shows a simplified
simplified color diffusion model with respect to several abstract operations. A worm
calls.
contamination example will be described later in this section.

The color diffusion model is based on our more general process
The
process label framework [15],
[15], where audit in(defined as
as process label) is propagated and preserved in a system. We also note that process color
formation (defined
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Abstract
Abstract Operation
< 31,0
sl . o >
create <
CTeate
create <
< 31,32
s l . sp >
CTeate
read
Tead

1

I

I Description

Color Difisioiz
Diffusion
= COlOT(31)
color(sl)
color(o) =
COlOT(O)

I

< 31,0
sl. o >
<

color(s2)=
= COlOT(3d
color(sl)
COlOT(32)

sl creates a new object 0o
Subject 31

I

= COlOT(O)
color(o)
colol-(s1)u=
COlOT(31)U

< 31,32
s l . s2 >
<
write <
< 31,0
s l _o >
wTite

I Example Events/Actions

create, mkdir, link,

I mknod, pipe, symlink

sl creates a new subject 32
s2
Subject 31
sl reads from object 0o
Subject 31

c o l o r ( s l )=
=
~ COlOT(32)
co10r(s2) Subject 31
sl reads from subject 32
s2
COlOT(31)U

read
Tead

color(o)u =
= COlOT(31)
color(sl)
COlOT(O)U

sl writes into object 0o
Subject 31

color(s2)u= COlOT(31)
colol-(sl)
COlOT(32)U

sl writes into subject 32
s;!
Subject 31
Subject 31
sl destroys
destroys the object 0o
Subject 31
sl destroys
destroys the subject 32
s2

I

s l : s:! >
< 31,32
< 31,0
sl,o >
<
destroy <
< 31,32
s l . s2 >
de3tToy
write
wTite

destroy
de3tToy

I

-

I

-

1

fork,
fork, vfork, clone,
execve
read, readv,
readv, recv,
recv,
access,
access, stat,
stat, fstat,
fstat, msgrcv
ptrace
write, writev,
writev, truncate,
truncate,
chmod, chown, fchown,
fchown,
send, sendfile
sendfile
ptrace, kill,
unlink, rmdir, close
kill, exit

I : A simplified
simplified color diffusion model. A subject is a process while an object is a shared resource.
Table I:

diffusion reflects various information flow
20, 21] in many aspects such as explicit/implicit
flow models [14,
[14,20,21]
explicit/implicit inforinformation flows
flows [30].
[3(3]. In this paper, we only consider the information flow
flow through syscall interfaces, with the
processes as subjects and intermediate resources as objects. Other means such as using CPU utilization or
disk space availabil
ity to convey information are beyond the scope of this paper. In the following,
availability
following, we describe
two types of syscall-based color diffusion:

Direct diffusion
diffusion involves one process directly affecting the color of another process. It can happen in a
number of ways: (1)
( 1 ) Process spawning: If
If a process issues the fork, vfork,
vfork, or clone system call, a new
child process will usually be spawned and it will inherit the color of the parent process. (2)
(2) Code
Code injection: A

ptrace system call) to modify the memory space of another process to
process may use code injection (e.g. via
viaptrace

(3) Signal
Signalprocessing:
change its functionality. The color of the injected process will be updated accordingly. (3)
processing:
authorized,
A process may send a special signal (e.g., the kill command) to another process. If received and authorized,
the signal will invoke corresponding signal handling and thus affect the execution flow
flow of the signaled process.

s l to 32
s2 can be represented as 31
sl =?
+ 0o =?
+ 32,
s2, where 0o is an intermediate
Indirect diffusion from process 31
resource (object).
(object). Various types of intermediate resources exist: some resources are dynamically created and

(e.g., UNIX sockets); other resources such as files
files can persiswill not exist after the process is terminated (e.g.,
tently exist and may later affect another process if that process acquires some input from these resources. To
support indirect diffusion, the system data structure for an intermediate resource will be enhanced to record
the influence of a process (i.e. its color).
color). Later, when another process gets input from
from the "tainted"
"tainted" resource,
the process will be tainted the same color

'.

I.

Common resource types supported in current Linux systems

'TO determine which input actually
a c t ~ ~ a l leads
ly
output. we show in [16]
[I61 that such problem is equivalent to solving the Halting
ITo
to an output,
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I

1

include files,
files, directories, network sockets (including UNIX sockets), named pipes (FIFO),
(FIFO), and IPe
IPC (messages,
semaphores, and shared memory). We also note the existence of special system-wide control resources like
system timer/clock,
timerlclock, which could be used to indirectly influence another process. However, as the infOimation
information

flow through the influence is usually limited (i.e., low-bandwidth channel) and we are not aware of any worm
flow
utilizing these special resources to affect other processes, we do not explicitly address them in this paper.
incl sock(80)

-

\

11
' 15
5
fll

I\-

~5.

dt~p3(5.
0): "up2(5.
dup2(5. J),
1 ): "up2(5.2)
dlnpZ(5.2) "00"(0....)
~.cild(O....)
0),

uup2{5. 0): uup2(5. J): ulIp2(5.2) rCi.ld(O.... )

uup2(5.
dupZ(5. 0):
0 ) :ullp2(5.
dupZ(5. ]):
1 ): uup2(5.2)
dup2c5.2) rC<ld{O....)
rcotl(0. ...)

cxccvc

2568(cxccvc):

tc~rk.crccvc

2587- h i n l ~ n t

25~f1:

-

CXCCVC

/hin/b::l~h

-i

CO~I~ICCI

unix

Ibrk. cxccvc
fork.

,"I: hi,,//%h

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ( " / V S ~ / I ~ I I I ~ / . I I C ~ - ~ O C ~ C I '

connect

u n i x s o c k ( " / v a r / r ~ ~ scd~s~,ckcl")
n/.~~

thill/nn -rf Itmp/.hugtraq.c

2: A coloring diffusion view showing the initial break-in of the Slapper worm
Figure 2:

A worm example Figure 2 illustrates the process color diffusion during the break-in of the Slapper worm
[42],
[42], which exploits a vulnerable Apache service as its break-in point. In Figure 2, an oval represents a

running process, a rectangle represents a file,
file, and a diamond represents a network socket. The number inside
"httpd" processes
the oval is the PID while the following string is the name of the process. Initially, all Apache "httpd"
"RED". Right after the successful exploitation, the exploited "httpd"
"httpd" process (pID:
(PID: 2568, color:
are colored "RED".
"Ibinllsh" (2568,
(2568, RED), which then executes (sys--.execve
(sys_execve
RED) executes (sys-execve syscall) the program "/bin//sh"
"/binhash -i" (2568, RED). The "/bin/bash
"Ibin/bash -i" process further spawns (by sysfork)
syscall) the program "/binlbash
sysjork) two
child processes: process "/bin/rm
"Ibinlrm -rf /tmp/.bugtraq.c"
1tmpl.bugtraq.c" (2586, RED) and process "/bin/cat"
"Ibinlcat" (2587,
(2587, RED) - their

diffusion. Later on, the WRITE operation (sys-write)
colors are inherited from their parent process via direct diffusion.
of process "/bin/cat"
"Ibinlcat" (2587,
(2587, RED) updates the file
file (ltmp/.uubugtraq),
(/tmp/.uubugtraq), which is thus tainted "RED".
"RED". As we

4, this file
file will be used to generate (sys...
(sysread
read syscall) the worm process to infect other
will show in Section 4,
vulnerable hosts. Via indirect diffusion,
diffusion, the worm process will also be colored "RED".
"RED".
problem [SO,
[50,5 I].
I]. To be conservative. we consider that once a process reads from a tainted source. it will also be tainted.

6

(b) Wrapped system calls

(a)
(a) Original system calls

(c)
(c) Intercepted system calls

3: Various hooking points intercepting system calls
Figure 3:

2.3 Log Information Collection
(syscall) interception to generate log entries and tag them with
Process coloring employs system call (syscall)

7, 29, 36, 39, 44],
441, syscall interception is effective
effective in revealing and
process colors. As demonstrated in [6,
[6, 7,
understanding intrusion steps and actions.
actions. However,
However, a simple syscall-based hooking mechanism may be

attack, where attackers can easily avoid or even subvert [23]
[23] the log collection
vulnerable to the re-hooking attack,
shows the original
original
intercepting. Figure 3(a) shows
function. Figure 3 compares various hooking points for syscall intercepting.
implementation in the current Linux kernel. Figure 3(b) demonstrates the popular syscall wrapping
wrappir7g technique
to intercept system calls.
calls. Syscall wrapping modifies the system call table and redirects the corresponding

modified, previous interception
interception
calls to its own implementation. Unfortunately, if the system call table is later modified,
and redirection will be invalid.
361, which are therefore
invalid. This type of syscall interception is used in [6,
[6, 31, 36],
vulnerable to this re-hooking attack. Figure 3(c) shows a more advanced technique, which intercepts system
calls before or while invoking
[44] implements this type of interception by
invoking the system call dispatcher.
dispatcher. Systrace [44]

However, it is still possible
modifying the system call dispatcher and thus achieves better tamper-resistance. However,
[31] for an advanced intruder to avoid the interception if the corresponding syscall
syscall interrupt handler (e.g.,
(e.g., "int
[31]

0x80" in Linux) is hooked in the first
first place.
Ox80"
Our design is based on the virtual machine introspection technique [28].
[28]. Though similar to Figure 3(c),
3(c),
the interception happens not in the syscall dispatcher, but on the virtual machine virtualization path. As such,
the interceptor is an integral
integral part of the underlying virtual machine implementation (Section 3) achieving
stronger tamper-resistance. Information about each intercepted system call (e.g.
(e.g. current process, syscall
number, parameters, return value, and return address) forms a log entry,
entry, which is tagged with the color of the
current process.
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3

Implementation
Implementation
In this section, we present key aspects of process coloring implementation. Our prototype leverages User-

Mode Linux (UML),
(UML), an open-source VM implementation where the guest OS runs directly in the unmodifi
ed user space of the host OS, and only considers the ext2 file
file systerrt.
s y s t e d . In order to support process coloring,
coloring,
a number of key data structures
(e.g., task_stTuct,
task-stru.ct. ext2_inode_info)
ext2in.ode-info) are modified to accommodate the color
structures (e.g.,
information.

3.1 Process Color Setting
In our prototype, a new field color is added to the process control block (PCB) structure, i.e., taskstruct,
taskstruct,
in Linux kernel.
setcolor
kernel. To facilitate the setting and retrieval of the color field,
field, two additional system calls (sys...
(syssetcolor
and s)ls-getcolor)
syLgetcolor) are implemented. There exists a possibility that these two new syscalls might be abused to
undermine process coloring.
coloring. Suppose their syscall interfaces are exposed, it would be easy for worm authors
to add additional code to corrupt the color assignment. Though a strong authentication scheme may be used to
restrict the usage of these two syscalls, it is not desirable as it essentially achieves security by obscurity.
obscurity. Our
solution to this problem is to create and maintain a separate color mapping table within the syscall interceptor,
interceptor,
which allows process color setting only within a certain time period after a service starts.

3.2 Color Diffusion
Diffusion
Direct diffusion
fork/vfork/clone system call, it will inherit the color of
diffusion If
If a new process is created by the forWvforWcIone
its parent process. When a process is being manipulated via the
ptrace system call, the diffusion of color will
theptrace
depend on the system call parameter. If the call has parameter PTRACEYEEKTEXT,
PTRACEPEEKTEXT. PTRACEYEEKDATA,
PTRACEPEEKDATA, or
PTRA
CEYEEKUSER, the color(s) of the ptraced process will be diffused to the ptracing process. Conversely,
PTRACEPEEKUSER,
Conversely, if

the call has parameter PTRACEYOKETEXT,
PTRACEPOKETEXT. PTRACEYOKEDATA,
PTRACEPOKEDATA, or PTRACEYOKEUSER,
PTRACEPOKEUSER, the color(s) of the
ptracing process will be diffused to the ptraced process. For signal processing, the color(s) of the signaling
process will be diffused to the signaled process. Finally, there are system calls (syLwaitpid
(s)u-cvaitpid and syLwait4)
sys-wair4)
that will lead to color diffusion from the child process to the parent process.

Indirect diffusion
diffusion Indirection diffusion involves
involves an intermediate resource (object).
(object). In principle, it is feasifeasible that the system data structure for the corresponding resource be extended to record the color information.
Among all possible intermediate resources, files
files and directories are the two most exploited by worms. Since
2We
'we are currently implementing process coloring on another VM platform Xen [24] and we expect even better performance than
our UML-based prototype due to Xen's
Xen's para-virtualization approach.
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they are persistent resources, their colors also need to be persistently recorded. Intuitively, we can extend the
corresponding inode data structure to accommodate the color attribute. However, adding a color field may es-

readinglwriting files
files from/to
fromlto a hard disk or even corrupt the underlying
sentially change the implementation of reading/writing
file
file system. After carefully examining all fields
fields in current inode data structure,
structure, i.e., ext2 inode info,
i n f o , we fi
nd that the field
field iLfile...
$ l e ad
acl is intended to record the corresponding access control flags
flags (ACL) but is not used
in the ext2
est2 file
file system. In our current prototype, this field is leveraged to save the color value (represented as

bitmap) of the corresponding file
file or directory.
directory. Note that there is another possible field,
field, i.e., ii dir.
dir ad,
acl, which is
intended to record the access control flags
flags for the corresponding directory. However,
However, this field has already been

file size representation for files
files larger than 4GB. For
borrowed to serve as an additional 32-bit field for a 64-bit file
non-persistent resources (e.g.,
(e.g., IPC and network sockets), our current prototype only supports sockets,
sockets, shared
memory, and pipes. However, for other non-persistent resources, adding a new field is not too challenging.

3.3 Log Collection

Guest
Gue\c User
Ubel Space

Safe log
collect~on
f~le
Log file

Guest OS KemeVUML
KerneVUML
'---+I-_Guest

Host OS Kernel

4: Tamper-resistant log collection by positioning the interceptor on the system call virtualization path
Figure 4:

implementation, i.e. UML, as
The log collection mechanism is based on the underlying virtual machine implementation,
shown in Figure 4. UML adopts a system call-based virtualization approach and supports VMs in the user

space of the host OS.
0 s . Leveraging the capability of ptrace, a special thread is created to intercept the system
calls made by any process in the VM, and to redirect them to the guest OS kernel. The interceptor for system
call log collection is located on the system call virtualization path. Therefore, it is tamper-resistant from

VM. Moreover, once the interceptor has collected a certain amount of
malicious processes running inside the VM.
log data (e.g., 16K),
16K), the log data will be pushed down to the host domain. One important benefit is that the

file within the host domain will not interrupt the normal execution of the VM. This creates
analysis on the log file
data. Applications benefiting from
the possibility of external runtime system monitoring based on colored log data.
5.1.
this opportunity will be discussed in Section 5.
I.
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4 Evaluation
4.1
4.1 Evaluation of Run-Time Overhead
To measure the overhead introduced by process coloring, we perform a number of experiments using
McVoy's LMbench [40],
[40], a suite of benchmarks targeting various
various subsystems of UNIX platforms. The experiments are conducted using a Dell PowerEdge 2650 server running Linux 2.4.18 with a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon
processor and 2GB RAM.
RAM. Three sets of experiments are performed: running LMbench on the original Linux
kernel (Linux),
unmodified UML kernel (UML),
(Linux), on the unmodified
(UML), and on the modified UML kernel with process coloring
capability (COLOR).
(COLOR). The results are shown in Table 2.
Configuration
Linux
UML
COLOR

null cal
0.47
11.0
11.0
11.0
11.0

open close
close
2.11
2.1 1
146
146
147
147

signal
signal handler
2.47
28.5
29.0

fork
fork
117
117
4707
4910

exec
363
8016
8221
8221

(a)
(a) Process-related times in JLS
ps

Configuration
Configuration
Linux
UML
COLOR

2p/OK
0.81
0.8 1
9.11
9.1 1
10.9
10.9

2p/16K
2p/ 16K
1.17
1.17
8.75
8.75
11.5
11.5

2p/64K
J.l9
1.19
9.67
10.7
10.7

16p/16K
16p116K
3.48
16.7
16.7
19.1
19.1

16p/64K
16p/64K
22.2
46.7
47.2

(b) Context switching times in JLS
ps

Configuration
Configuration
Linux
UML
LML
COLOR

create (10K)
(1OK)
58.8
58.8
226.2
228.6

delete
delete (10K)
(10K)
10.5
10.5
90.2
90.2

mmap
141.0
141.0
772.0
792.0

page fault
1.35
1.35
15.0
15.1
15.1

select ( 100fd)
select(100fd)
3.197
3.197
21.9
21.9

(c) File and VM
YM system latencies in JLS
ps

Table
Table 2: LMBench results showing low additional process coloring overhead
Table 2(a) shows process operation overhead. Table
Table 2(b) shows context switch times under varying number of processes and working set sizes.
sizes. File system and virtual memory latency results are shown in Table
2(c). The results show that UML suffers a significant
significant performance penalty due to its user-level implementation.
tion. However,
However, process coloring only incurs a very small
small extra performance degradation beyond the original
UML. The reason lies in the interceptor placement. By positioning the interceptor within
within the system call virtualization path, our prototype is able to avoid an additional context switch per system call, which is needed
in other syscall interception schemes [39].
[39]. Also, the log data push-down is not performed upon every invocation of system call. Instead, an internal cache (l6K)
(16K) is maintained to amortize the overall disk write
operations. Finally, we note that process coloring is not dependent on a specific VM platform. Moreover, we
10

signifexpect that the performance penalty caused by virtualization (not by the design of process coloring) be signif[24] with para-virtualization) and the upcoming
efficient VM platforms (e.g., Xen [24]
icantly reduced with more efficient
[27]).
architecture support for VMs (e.g., Intel's Vanderpool technology [27]).
architecture

4.2 Experiments with Real-World
Real-World Worms
We evaluate the effectiveness of process coloring using a number of real-world Internet worms: Adore
[3],
[3], Ramen [4],
[4], Lion [5],
[5], Slapper [42],
[42], SARS
SARS [11],
[I I], and their variants. Each worm experiment is conducted

[32], which is a realistic, confined, and scaled-down
in a virtual distributed worm playground called vGround [32],
Internet environment consisting of network entities and end hosts realized as VMs with process coloring
capability. vGround makes it easy and efficient to create VMs running real-world services as well as VMs
running as service clients.
clients. vGround enables safe worm experiments by confining all traffic
traffic within the vGround.

facilitates experiments with a multi-vector worm (e.g., Ramen worm [4]),
[4]), which infects different hosts
It also facilitates
(VMs)
(VMs) via different break-in points

'.

3.

Service
Exploited Service
(CYE
(CVE references)
references)
Time period being analyzed
analyzed
Number of log entries
Size
Size of log
loe data
Number of worm-relevant log entries
Size
Size of worm-relevant log..data
Number of files
files "touched" by the worm
Percentage of worm-relevant logs
Percentage
L

Lion Wonn
Wonn
Slapper Worm
Wornz
Worm
Stapper
SARS Worm
BIND (bind-8.2.2...P5-9)
0)
(bind-8.2.2P5-9) Apache (apache-l.3.19-5)
(apache-I .3.19-5) Samba (samba-2.2.5-1
(samba-2.2.5-10)
(CYE-2001-0010)
(CAN-2002-0656)
(CAN-20m-020l
)
(CAN-2003-0201)
(CVE-2001-0010)
(CAN-2002-0656)
24 hours
24 hours
24 hours
129,386
293,759
166,646
166,646
129,386
293,759
18.5MB
18.5MB
8.OM
10.7MB
8.0M
10.7MB
195,884
195,884
66,504
19,494
66,504
12.2MB
12.2MB
3.9MB
1.3MB
3.9MB
1.3MB
120,342
62
200
120,342
65.9%
48.7%
65.9%
12.1%
48.7%
12.1%

Table
Table 3:
3: Statistics of process coloring log data in three worm experiments
Due to space constraint, we only present experiments with Lion, Slapper,
Slapper, and SARS
SARS worms. Table 3 shows

statistics of their respective log data.
data. Each log file
file contains log entries collected during a 24-hour period,
key statistics
including both worm-related and normal service access entries. During each experiment, process coloring

(1) We are able to identify the worms' break-in points before performing detailed
benefits: (1)
demonstrates its key benefits:
log analysis.
(bind-8.2.2P5-9) for Lion worm, the Apache server
analysis. The break-in points are the BIND server (bind-8.2.2...P5-9)
(apache-1.3.19-5
openssl-0.9.6b-8 package) for Slapper worm, and the Samba server (samba-2.2.5-1O)
(samba-2.2.5-10)
(apache-] .3.19-5 with openssl-O.9.6b-8

(2) The log data that need to be inspected for detailed worm investigation is only 48.7%
48.7%
SARS worm.
worm. (2)
for SARS
(Lion worm), 65.9%
% (SARS
65.9% (Slapper worm), and 12.1
12.1%
(SARS worm) of the total logged events, respectively. We
note that, since log entries are naturally partitioned by their colors, increasing background service accesses
3For
Ramen worm has three possible break-in points: LPRng (CYE-2000-0917),
3 ~ oexample,
example.
r
(CVE-2000-0917).rpc.statd
rpc.slatd (CYE-2000-0666),
(CVE-2000-0666),and wu-ftp
WLI-ftp
(CVE-2000-0573)- the last one cannot lead to a successful exploitation as our vGround experiment shows.
shows.
(CYE-2000-0573)
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(i.e.
(i.e. accesses to unrelated services) in the experiments will further reduce the percentage of worm-related log.
log.
(3)
(3) Since the worm break-in point (vulnerable service) is identified
identified before
before log analysis,
analysis, it is possible to further
filter the log entries that record normal accesses to the vulnerable service, which have krzown
known and different
footprint from that of a worm infection.

4.2.1
4.2.1 Lion Worm Contamination Investigation

353: ponmap
NFSfRPC Service

378: rpc.slalu

_

xinctd Service

_

LPD Service

_

SCl1dmuil ScrviL'c

Figure 5:
5 : A process coloring view of a vulnerable system BEFORE Lion infection
Figure 5 shows a process coloring view of an uninfected
uninfecred system running a BIND server vulnerable to the
NFSIRPC service (portmap
Lion worm. There are also a number of other services hosted at the same system: NFSRPC
@ortmap
and rpc.statd), printer service (lpd),
(Iprl), and mail service (sendmail).
(sendmail). A different color is assigned to each service.
service.
Process named has the color "RED"

4.

The Lion worm is unleashed from a different VM in the v
vGround
~ r o u n5 d. ~ .

After the experiment,
experiment, we obtain a log file
file whose entries are conveniently partitioned by their colors. Among
the "RED"
"RED" entries whose provenance is the named process, we observe an abnormal event that a shell process
worm. To further reduce the inspected
was spawned.
spawned. This is one of the contaminations inflicted by the Lion worm.
log volume, entries generated by normal accesses to the BIND server from other legitimate VM clients in
the vGround are filtered.
filtered. We then use the remaining "RED"
"RED" log entries to derive a Lion worm contamination
6.
graph as shown in Figure 666.

We confirm that Figure 6 reveals all Lion worm contaminations by comparing our results with a detailed
Lion worm report [5].
[ 5 ] . The leftmost oval is the vulnerable named daemon (pID:
(PID: 31122).
31 122). After a successful
successful
exploitation of the named process, a worm replica is downloaded (Circle 2 in Figure 6). The worm then
overwrites all HTML files
index.htm1 in the system with a self-carried HTML file
file for web defacement
files named index.html
(Circle 3). Interestingly, we observe from the log that the worm attempts to execute the file
file replacement twice
4Due
printing of the manuscript for review convenience. '
4 ~ u toe the nature of process coloring, we would suggest color printins
5This
worm is instrumented to target the vulnerable VM for infection.
pr his ''seed''
'Seed"worm
infection. However. the worm copy transferred is unmodified.
6To
zoom-in feature of the Adobe Acrobat Reader®.
6 ~ view
o details of the worm contamination graph,
graph. we would suggest using the zooin-in
Reader@.
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3: Replacing all HTML files named index.html with a self-carried one

Figure 6: Lion worm contaminations reconstructed from "RED" log entries
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4: Installing the worm replica and inititating next round of infection

- a detail not
110treported in [5].
[5]. The first
first attempt to replace files
files is within the shell code (pID:
(PID: 31181)
31 181) after
executing the malicious buffer overrun code (Circle 2 and Circle 3). The second attempt happens when the
driving script .lli011.sh
./li017.~h(PID:
(PID: 31347)
31 347) is executed (Circle 4). The worm then tries to initiate the next round

files bind and
(Circle 4). In the thick dotted circle inside Circle 4, we find
find two "RED"
"RED" dangling files
of infection (Circle
bind.~.sh,which are introduced by the worm but never accessed by any worm-related process. Such anomaly
bindx.sh,
5.1). A forensic analysis of the VM reveals that these two files
files
deserves a further investigation (Section 5.1).
vulnerability. As there is only one VM running the vulnerable
contain the exploitation code for the BIND vulnerability.
BIND service in the vGround, the worm cannot find another host to infect and the file
file bindname.log
bindnamelog storing IP
addresses of possible victims is empty.
empty. As a result, the exploitation code is never launched.

4.2.2 Siapper
Slapper Worm Contamination Investigation
4.2.2
initially assign colors to service
The Slapper worm experiment is conducted in a different vGround. We initially
"RED". Through direct
processes in an uninfected VM. Especially, the vulnerable Apache service is assigned "RED".
diffusion, all spawned httpd worker processes are also colored "RED".
"RED". A process coloring view of the system

involves accesses to the other services as
before the Slapper infection is shown in Figure 7. The experiment involves
well as normal web accesses requesting a 2890-byte index.html
inde.x.htm1 file.
file.

0NFSlRPC
NFSIRPC Service

/ t:=)
~

~

- -:~:P~":,,,~ -:}/ _

- _~ -__ =- : : =;t

/_

x inetd Serv ice
SendmajJ Service

.• ~~~1~I;~~=:~;'::
'
"
"'
"
.

Service

.

,

7~~('_1"~-""""

~' ,

,,
,,
I
,,
,
,,

2~('~~~

-~~~~~"

-

Apache Service
vice

Figure 7:
7: A process coloring view of a Slapper-vulnerable system BEFORE infection

experiment, an examination on the log file
file shows a flurry of "RED"
"RED" log entries (>
(> 10000)
10000) within
After the experiment,
a very short period (1
infection. As the "RED"
"RED" color is associated
(1 minute) - an anomaly indicating a possible infection.

65.9% of the entire log file.
file.
server, we select all "RED" log entries,
entries, which constitute 65.9%
with the Apache web server,
A quick review of these log entries shows that the Slapper worm infection has a large and distinct footprint
in the infected host.
file is sent from the
host. During the transmission of a Slapper worm, an uuencoded source file
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Figure 8:
8: Slapper worm contaminations reconstructed from "RED"
"RED" log entries
infecter to the victim. More specifically,
specifically, the sender issues a sendch call for each byte of the uuencoded fi
Ie.
le. Correspondingly, the receiver uses a sysJead
s y s ~ e a dfor each byte received (total 94320 calls). Moreover, each
encoded byte is then written (the cat command) to a local file named /tmp/.uubugtraq,
/tmpl.uubugtraq, leading to another 94320

sys-write system calls. In sharp contrast, each normal web access only generates 15
15 log entries, recording
the known normal sequence of Apache server actions. Therefore, we remove these ("RED")
("RED") entries before
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Figure 9: Log excerpt showing the first exploitation of the Slapper worm attempting to get the over-writable
heap address in the vulnerable Apache server. BROWN log entries are not related.
constructing the Siapper worm contamination graph (Figure 8)7.
By comparing our results with a detailed Slapper worm analysis [42], we confirm that Figure 8 reveals
all contaminations by the Slapper worm. We first observe that the worm exploits an httpd worker process

(PID:2568) to gain system access. After that, an uuencoded version of the worm source code is downloaded
(Circle 1 in Figure 8) and uudecoded (Circle 2) to reconstruct the original code, which is then compiled
(Circle 3) to generate the worm binary. The binary is executed (Circle 4) to attempt to infect other hosts.
The collected log data further reveal that the exploitation of the Slapper worm is rather sophisticated. Before
the httpd worker process (pID: 2568) is exploited, 23 TCP connections have already been established with
different http worker processes between the infecter and the victim. Interestingly, 21 connections among them
have no payload; one connection is an invalid HTTP request, which turns out to be a request to obtain the
Apache server version; and the last connection has a short interaction as shown in the log excerpt in Figure
9. From [42], we know that one of the 21 plain connections is used to validate the reachability of the Apache
server, while the other 20 connections are made for depleting the Apache server pool to make sure that the
two subsequent exploitations will have the same heap layout. The first exploitation aims at reliably deriving
the over-writable heap address in the vulnerable Apache server. This heap address is then reused in the second
exploitation. All these connections and interactions are recorded by "RED" log entries.
7 We note that a general intrusion may mimic the normal sequence of service access actions [52]. However. it is more difficult for
self-propagating worms to do so because their o!llgoing propagation behavior is semantically different from a normal service access.
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4.2.3

SARS Worm Contamination Investigation

The SARS worm is a multi-platform worm, which is able to propagate across all major distributions of
Linux platforms (Redhat, Debian, SuSE, Mandrake, and Gentoo) and BSD platforms (FreeBSD, OpenBSD,
and NetBSD). As our current prototype is based on UML virtual machines, our experiment is conducted in a
Linux-based vGround. The vulnerable Samba service is assigned "RED".
-
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J_

XiUCld Sen-jcc

Figure 10: A process coloring view of a Redhat 8.0 system running multiple servers right after it is infected
by the SARS worm
After the experiment, only 12.1% of the entire Jog data are "RED", because of the large number of log
entries generated by other background services (e.g. sendmail, sshd, and dhclient) running in the Redhat 8.0
system. Derived from the "RED" log entries, Figure 10 shows the Redhat 8.0-based system right after the
infection of the SARS worm. Process smbd (PID: 5721) and process nmbd (PID: 5725) have the same color
("RED") as both of them belong to the Samba service. From the figure, it seems that the exploitation code
contains some redundancy as two "/bin/Ish" processes are executed and one just quits immediately after its
creation. Note that these two shell processes are spawned when the buffer overrun code is executed.
Continuing from process start.sh (PID: 6285, shown in Figure 10), Figure 11 further reveals the contaminations inflicted by the SARS worm. For readability, certain edges and nodes describing intermediate files are
omitted. From the figure, we observe that the SARS worm contains a very primitive user-level rootkit (Circle
4 and Circle 5 in Figure 11), whose purpose is to hide the existence of worm-related files, directories, active
processes, and network connections. Also, the SARS worm plants a number of backdoors such as a web
server and an ICMP-based backdoor, which allow an attacker to access the infected host later. System-wide
information such as host IP address, and configuration files including letclhosts and letc/passwd is collected
by the worm and sent to a hard-coded mail account (Circle 6). The integration of advanced payloads, such
as the rootkit in the SARS worm, indicates a recent trend in the underground evolution of more stealthy
17
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Figure II: SARS worm contaminations reconstructed from "RED" log entries
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self-propagating worms.

5
5.1

Other Applications and Possible Attacks
Other Applications

Malware investigation Process coloring can be naturally extended to support general mal ware investigation.
The goal is to understand the possible malicious actions and their impact on the infected system, which
can further guide the recovery from the malware's contaminations. In particular, process coloring is highly
effective in exposing the following two interesting anomaly points:

• Color mixing: Color mixing refers to the situation where a different color is diffused to an alreadycolored process. Based on the rationale of color diffusion, coloring mixing indicates that the process
is influenced by another process with a different color. Considering the initial assignment of different
colors to mutually unrelated service processes, such cross-service influence is mostly likely an anomaly
and warrants further investigation. For example, in one of our experiments, we run BIND and Apache
services in one VM and let the Lion worm infect the VM via the BIND vulnerability. The Lion worm
then contaminates the system by replacing index.html files with its own. We observe that log entries
recording subsequent web accesses bear the colors of both BIND and Apache.

• Dangling file: A dangling file is created by a malware infection, but is not accessed during the same
infection session. For example, if we re-examine Figures 6 and 11, some dangling files belong to
rootkitslbackdoors installed by worms: /sbin/asp by the Lion worm (Figure 6) and /etc/xinetd.d/thttpd
and /usrllib/shttpd by the SARS worm (Figure II). Though these rootkits are usually installed by
stealthy worms/malware to hide their presence, identification of dangling files can actually help to reveal
the presence of the rootkits.
Run-time monitoring and log visualization

As mentioned in Section 3.3, the log push-down mechanism

and color-based log partition provide a convenient means to externally monitor the running state of a networked server system, without interrupting the operations of the system. Process coloring can be used to
identify possible anomalies revealed by log colors (e.g., color mixing, deviating log pattern for a particular
color/service) during runtime and thus raise more timely alarms. We are currently extending our prototype
with a log visualization tool, which makes it more intuitive for administrators to monitor system states.
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5.2

Possible Attacks and Counter-Measures

Jamming attack

A worm could intentionally introduce many noise log entries to hide its actual intention.

For example, a worm could invoke a large number of "innocuous" or unrelated syscalls just to hide its real
infection attempts. However, tactically speaking, these actions still need to be considered as a part of the
worm's behavior in the infected system, even though they may not contribute to any real damage. Also, to the
worm's disadvantage, these noise log entries deviate from the normal log pattern of a specific color and will
trigger an alarm. Finally, the capability of color-based identification of a worm's entry point is still valid under
this attack, though it will take a more careful analysis to uncover the obfuscated intention.

Low-level attack

The integrity of colors associated with active processes and intermediate resources are

critical to worm investigation. As the current prototype maintains the color information within the kernel
of the system under inspection, it is possible that this information be manipulated through certain low-level
attacks. For example, if the process color is associated with the tasLstruct PCB structure, a method called
direct kernel object manipulation (DKOM) [17] can be leveraged to explicitly change the color value (e.g.,
by writing to the special device file Idevlkmem). Fortunately, solutions such as CoPilot[43], Livewire[28], and
Pioneer [46] have been proposed to address the issue of kernel integrity. Another possible counter-measure
is to create a shadow structure, which is instead maintained by the virtual machine monitor (VMM) and is
totally inaccessible from inside the VM. Compared with the current prototype, the shadow solution poses
significantly greater challenge in deriving VM operation semantics from low-level information collected via
virtual machine introspection, which may affect the accuracy and completeness of worm investigation results.

Diffusion-cutting attack It is possible that a worm might use a hidden channel to undermine the diffusion.
For example, a worm could use an initial part of an attack to crack a weak password, which is later used in
a separate session to gain the system access and complete the rest of worm contamination. Process coloring
can track any action performed within each break-in, but it cannot automatically associate the second break-in
with the first one. However, any anomaly within the second break-in will immediately expose the responsible
login session, which may lead to the identification of the cracked password. Based on the log data from the fi
rst break-in, the administrator may still be able to correlate those two disjunct break-ins.

Color saturation attack If a worm is aware of the coloring scheme, it might attempt to acquire more colors
from different services right after its break-in. As a result, the associated colors can not uniquely identify the
break-in point. However, to the worm's disadvantage, the color saturation attack will immediately lead to
an alarm of color mixing (Section 5.1) - an anomaly triggering further investigation. Color saturation attack
does expose a weakness of our current prototype, which uses a single color field. Although our prototype is
20

able to accommodate multiple colors (each bit in the color field represents a different color), it is not able to
differentiate between an inherited color and a diffused color. The inherited color of a process can only be
inherited from its parent and will not be changed by its own or others' behavior. The diffused colors, on the
other hand, reflect the color diffusions through its own or others' actions (e.g., sysJead and s)'s-write). With
this distinction, the inherited colors can be used to partition the log data, while the diffused colors can be
used to detect a color saturation attack and naturally identify all color-mix ing points for further examination
in affected partitions.

6

Related Work
The development of process coloring technique is inspired by the concept of transitive dependency track-

ing [26, 47, 49] originally proposed for failure recovery in fault tolerant systems. Process coloring also
reflects various information flow models [14,20,21]. With these concepts and models as theoretical underpinnings, a spectrum of taint-based techniques have recently been proposed for different aspects of system
security: Process coloring operates at the system call level to reveal worm break-in and contamination semantics; TaintCheck [41] works at the instruction level to detect overwrite attacks and generate exploit signatures;
TaintBochs [18] focuses on the lifetime tracking of sensitive data (e.g., passwords) in a system. While sharing
the same design philosophy, these techniques differ in their goals, design, implementation, and usage.
Process coloring can be integrated into existing log-based intrusion investigation tools [36, 38] so that
they become provenance-aware. BackTracker [36] is able to automatically reconstruct the sequences of steps
that occurred during an intrusion based on log data. More specifically, starting with an external detection point
(e.g., a corrupted file), BackTracker identifies files and processes that could have affected this detection point
and displays chains of events in a dependency graph. The follow-up work [38] of Backtracker proposes a
forward tracking capability that identifies all possible damages caused by the intrusion after the back-tracking
session. Both BackTracker and its forward tracking extension require the entire log data as input. With
process coloring enhancement, the break-in point of a worm can first be identified by the color of the detection
point, and the volume of input log data will be reduced by color-based log partition, resulting in more efficient
back-tracking and forward-tracking sessions. In addition, the colors and patterns of log entries may provide
alerts at runtime, leading to more timely investigations.
Process coloring can also be applied to enhance file and transaction repair/recovery systems. The Repairable File Service [56] aims to identify possible file system level corruptions caused by a root process, assuming that the administrator has already identified the root process that starts an attack or a human-involved
21

error. It then uses the log data to identify the files that may have been contaminated by that process. The
repairable file service implements a limited version of the forward tracking capability mentioned earlier by
only tracking file system-level corruptions. Meanwhile, there has been technique in the database area [13] that
is capable of recording contaminations at the transaction level and rolling back the damages if the transaction
is later found malicious. This technique also requires external identification of malicious processes or transactions. Process coloring can enhance these techniques by tracking more sophisticated contamination behavior
via color diffusion, raising anomaly alarms based on log colors and patterns, and achieving tamper-resistant
log collection.
Recent advances in virtual machine technologies have created tremendous opportunities for intrusion
monitoring and replay [7,25,28,33], system problem diagnosis [37,53,55], attack recovery and avoidance
[25,48], and data life-time tracking [18, 19]. For example, ReVirt [25] is able to replay a system's execution at the instruction level. Time-traveling virtual machines such as [37, 53, 55] provide a highly effective
means of re-examining and troubleshooting system execution or configuration. Process coloring complements
these efforts by leveraging virtual machine technologies for worm break-in and contamination investigation.

In addition, process coloring, as an advanced logging mechanism, can be integrated into other VM-based
networked systems to add provenance-awareness to these systems.

7

Conclusion
We have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of process coloring, a novel systematic

approach to provenance-aware tracing of worm break-in and contaminations. By associating a unique color
to each remotely-accessible service and diffusing the color based on actions performed by processes in the
system, process coloring achieves two key benefits: (1) color-based identification of a worm's break-in point
before detailed log analysis and (2) color-based partitioning of log data. Process coloring improves log-based
worm investigation tools by reducing the amount of log entries to be processed and by providing color-related
"leads" for more timely investigation. Experiments with a number of real-world Internet worms demonstrate
the practicality and effectiveness of process coloring.
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